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Workers' Compensation
by H. Michael Bagley*
and J. Benson Ward*
The 2012-2013 survey period featured notable decisions of the
appellate courts in a wide range of areas along with legislation
impacting the Workers' Compensation Act' in several important areas,
including a 400-week cap on medical benefits.'
I.

LEGISLATION

In what may have been a first, the legislative package drafted by the
Advisory Committee of the State Board of Workers' Compensation (the
Board) passed through both legislative chambers without a dissenting
vote, notwithstanding some significant changes in the Workers'
Compensation Act.3
Perhaps the most noteworthy legislative change was made to section
34-9-200 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) 4 concerning the return of a cap on medical benefits.' There had previously been
a $5000 monetary cap on the employer's liability for medical expenses,
unless additional expenditures were authorized by the Board, and that
cap was not deleted by the legislature until 1985.6 For accidents
* Partner in the firm of Drew, EckI & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory
University (B.A., 1977); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 1980). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
** Partner in the firm of Drew, EckI & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University
of Georgia (B.A., summa cum laude, 2002); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 2005). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. O.C.G.A. ch. 34-9 (2008 & Supp. 2013).
2. Ga. H.R. Bill 154, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws (codified at O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200 (Supp.
2013)). For an analysis of Georgia workers' compensation law during the prior survey
period, see H. Michael Bagley & J. Benson Ward, Workers' Compensation,Annual Survey
of Georgia Law, 64 MERCER L. REv. 341 (2012).
3. Ga. H.R. Bill 154 § 1.
4. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200 (2008 & Supp. 2013).
5. Id.
6. Ga. H.R. Bill 424 § 3, Reg. Sess., 1985 Ga. Laws 727.
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occurring after July 1, 2013, that are not designated as catastrophic
injuries pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200.1(g),' the employer's liability
for medical expenses terminates at the end of 400 weeks from the date
of injury.' There is no similar cap for injuries occurring before July 1,
2013.9
The statutory penalty for the late payment of medical expenses
contained in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2030 was modified to reduce the time
period required for payment of mileage expenses to fifteen days from the
receipt of charges and reports required by the Board.n Penalties are
triggered if "not paid when due."12 Thus, penalties are the same
whether for mileage or other medical expenses that are not timely
paid.' 3 However, the "due date" is different for mileage expenses and
all other medical expenses.' The due date is a period that runs from
the time of receipt of charges and reports required by the Board until an
outer limit by which time the payment "shall be paid within."15 The
period is fifteen days for mileage and thirty days for all other medical
expenses.' 6 Therefore, the due date is any point during the fifteen-day
period for mileage, and thirty days for all other medical expenses, thus
the penalties are triggered for mileage expenses if they are not paid
within forty-five days from receipt, and for all other expenses, sixty days
from receipt.' 7 However, if the defense to late payment penalties is
that the documentation required by the Board was not received, the
defense is waived unless submitted in writing within fifteen days for
mileage expenses and within thirty days for all other medical expenses.' 8
Since 1992, the Workers' Compensation Act has contained a provision
designed to facilitate an employee's return to work on a trial basis
following an injury." According to this provision, where the employee
is released to work with restrictions imposed by an authorized treating
physician, the employer tenders a job suitable for those restrictions, and

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200.1(g) (2008 & Supp. 2013).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(aX2).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(aX1).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-203.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-203(c)(3).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-203(c)(1).
Id.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-203(c)(3).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-203(c)(2).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-240 (2008 & Supp. 2013).
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the employee attempts to return to work but is unable to perform the
proffered job for more than fifteen days, the employer is required to
immediately reinstate benefits.2 0 If the employee does not attempt the
proffered job, then the employer is allowed to terminate benefits
unilaterally with submission of required documentation. 2
This
provision tended to promote "drive-by" returns to work, where employees
would briefly attempt the proffered job primarily to avoid unilateral
suspension of benefits. In 2013, the legislature redefined what constitutes an attempt of the job needed to trigger the fifteen-day trial period
with the requirement that the employee attempt the proffered job for
either "eight cumulative hours or one scheduled workday, whichever is
greater. 22 The failure to achieve those minimums is equivalent to a
refusal to attempt the proffered job, and benefits may subsequently be
suspended unilaterally.23
In the midst of the legislature's fiscal conservatism during the
recessionary economy, there were no increases in the maximum benefits
for either temporary, total disabilities (TTD) or temporary, partial
disabilities (TPD) since 2007.24 For all injuries occurring after July 1,
2013, the maximum weekly income benefit for temporary, total disability
was increased from $500 to $525,25 and the maximum weekly income
benefit for temporary, partial disability was increased from $334 to
$350.
II.

AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE MEDICAL INFORMATION

In Arby's Restaurant Group, Inc. v. McRae," the Georgia Supreme
Court unanimously reversed the Georgia Court of Appeals and ruled
that the Board acted within its discretion by ordering a claimant to
either sign a limited authorization to release medical information or
have her case removed from the hearing calendar.2 8 The supreme court
determined that an employer or insurer may seek relevant protected

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
(2007),
25.
26.
27.
45.
28.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-240(b)(1).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ga. H.R. Bill 424, Reg. Sess., 2007 Ga. Laws 616; Ga. H.R. Bill 434, Reg. Sess.
§ 6 (unenacted).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-261 (2008 & Supp. 2013).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-262 (2008 & Supp. 2013).
292 Ga. 243, 734 S.E.2d 55 (2012). See also Bagley & Ward, supra note 2, at 344Id. at 243, 247, 734 S.E.2d at 56, 58.
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health information through informal, oral communications with a
treating physician.29
The supreme court held that O.C.G.A. § 34-9-207(a)" unambiguously
provides that once an employee initiates a workers' compensation claim,
that employee waives any privilege with respect to medical records and
information related to that claim." The court of appeals previously
limited this disclosure of medical records and information to tangible
documents. 2 However, the supreme court ruled that this position is
not supported by the language of the statute; accordingly, O.C.G.A. § 349-207(a) includes oral communications.
The supreme court also declined to apply decisions involving medical
malpractice, such as Baker v. Wellstar Health System, Inc.," to
workers' compensation cases." The court expressly observed that the
legislature has designed Georgia's workers' compensation system to
provide an efficient and streamlined process for obtaining medical care
and income benefits within a no-fault system, and that allowing equal
access to all relevant medical information furthers this policy and
intent." The court urged parties in a workers' compensation claim to
act reasonably and within the parameters of privacy protections afforded
to health information unrelated to the work related injury. It also
emphasized the Board's role as a gatekeeper in resolving disputes
arising over this issue.
III. THE MALONEY BURDEN
In Brown Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Maughon," the court of
appeals returned to the framework set out in Maloney v. Gordon County
Farms40 to examine whether a claimant conducted a diligent job search
sufficient to justify payment of indemnity benefits.4 1 The court
affirmed the Board, which had reversed the award and finding of the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that a claimant who had contacted

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 244-47, 734 S.E.2d at 56-58.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-207(a) (2008 & Supp. 2013).
McRae, 292 Ga. at 244, 734 S.E.2d at 56.
Id.
Id. at 245, 734 S.E.2d at 57.
288 Ga. 336, 703 S.E.2d 601 (2010).
McRae, 292 Ga. at 246, 734 S.E.2d at 57.
Id. at 246-47, 734 S.E.2d at 58.
Id. at 247, 734 S.E.2d at 58.
Id.
317 Ga. App. 106, 728 S.E.2d 757 (2012).
265 Ga. 825, 462 S.E.2d 606 (1995).
Brown Mech. Contractors,Inc., 317 Ga. App. at 107, 728 S.E.2d at 758.
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more than one hundred employers over the six-month period leading up
to his hearing date, after being laid off for reasons unrelated to his
compensable shoulder injury, had made a diligent search for work. 4 2
The Board relied on several facts in finding that the claimant's job
search was not diligent, including the following: the claimant's 110
searches were made over 144 "work days," an average of less than once
per day; the claimant failed to follow up with twenty-two employers; the
claimant went periods of eighteen and twenty-seven consecutive days
without searching; the claimant lost two offered positions because of a
purported need for surgery that had not been previously scheduled; and
despite employment history in managerial and sales positions, the
claimant sought physical-labor jobs and avoided retail jobs.
The court of appeals framed the issue for review as one involving
whether the Board's findings of fact and conclusions of law were
supported by the "any evidence" standard, and subsequently determined
that there was some evidence in the record to support the Board's
conclusion that the job search was not diligent.4 The court was not
persuaded by evidence that the claimant had three job offers retracted
after his injury was disclosed.
IV.

CHANGE IN CONDITION CONTRASTED WITH A FICTIONAL NEW
ACCIDENT

The court of appeals and the supreme court had opportunities this
year to clarify the ever-evolving tension between a change in condition
and a fictional new accident. In Scott v. Shaw Industries, Inc.,46 the
claimant injured her right foot in 1996 while working as a carpet
inspector, resulting in a partial amputation and several months of
unemployment, during which time she received TTD benefits. She
returned to work at a desk job, but the foot prosthetic she wore as a
result of the initial injury caused knee pain and an altered gait. She
underwent bilateral knee surgery in 1997 and returned to work at her
desk job where she worked over the next twelve years despite progressively worsening knee pain. In September 2009 her treating physician
took her out of work completely.4
The claimant argued that she was entitled to TTD benefits under the
fictional-new-injury doctrine as of the date in 2009 when she was taken

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 106, 109, 728 S.E.2d at 758, 760.
Id. at 111, 728 S.E.2d at 761.
291 Ga. 313, 729 S.E.2d 327 (2012).
Id. at 313-14, 729 S.E.2d at 328-29.
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out of work completely. The employer argued that the claimant's
inability to work was merely a result of a change in condition for the
worse, barring her claim for TTD benefits on the basis that the statute
of limitations had expired.4 8 The ALJ awarded the claimant TTD
benefits, the Board and Superior Court of Bartow County each affirmed,
but the court of appeals reversed."9
The supreme court reviewed the controlling case of Central State
Hospital v. Jameso and its framework for distinguishing between a
fictional new accident and a change in condition.5 ' The court applied
the third scenario set out by the court in James-where an employee
undergoes a change in condition when he is awarded benefits and
returns to his employment performing his ordinary job duties, but as a
result of wear and tear of ordinary life and the performance of his
normal duties and not a specific work incident, his condition gradually
worsens to the point that he can no longer continue his ordinary
work.52
In Scott, the court determined that the claimant had been awarded
compensation as a result of her initial foot injury in 1996, returned to
work in a new position that did not require strenuous activity, and
subsequently developed knee and gait problems due to the wear and tear
of ordinary life. The court held that this gradual worsening constituted
a change in condition for the worse, and not a new accident." Consequently, the claim was barred by the statute of limitations, which the
court determined began to run as of the date of the initial foot injury.5 4
The court of appeals addressed the same issue in EvergreenPackaging,
Inc. v. Prather," but reached a different conclusion." In that case,
the claimant suffered a back injury in 2002 while working as a forklift
operator responsible for loading trucks with milk and juice cartons, and
the claimant received indemnity and medical benefits before returning
to work for the employer. Almost three years after returning to work,
the claimant was transferred to a different position making and cleaning
plates used in the employer's printing presses. Although this job
required significant physical activity, including lifting up to fifty pounds

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 314, 729 S.E.2d at 329.
Id.
147 Ga. App. 308, 248 S.E.2d 678 (1978).
Scott, 291 Ga. at 314-15, 729 S.E.2d at 329.
Id. (quoting James, 147 Ga. App. at 309-10, 248 S.E.2d at 679).
Id. at 315, 729 S.E.2d at 329.
Id.
318 Ga. App. 440, 734 S.E.2d 209 (2012).
Id. at 440, 734 S.E.2d at 210.
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and bending to the floor, it was somewhat less strenuous than his prior
work as a forklift operator."
The claimant continued to work, despite progressively worsening pain,
but when the job duties changed in 2008 to require further bending, his
problems increased. In 2010 his treating physician deemed the condition
an exacerbation of his 2002 injury caused by work-related activity. The
ALJ held that the claimant sustained a new injury on February 26,
2010, because of having to bend further, and awarded TTD benefits; the
Board and Superior Court of Clarke County affirmed." The court of
appeals determined that the facts did not fit the third James scenario
(described above), which involved subsequent work that may aggravate
a condition and result in a new injury even when there is no new
accident." To distinguish a change in condition from a fictional new
accident, the court considered the "intervention of new circumstances."60 Here, based on the claimant working a different job that caused
him to bend over further, which increased back problems, sufficient
evidence existed to support a determination that a fictional new accident
had occurred.61

V

EXCLUSiVE REMEDY

Georgia courts addressed the exclusive remedy provision in several
holdings during the survey period. In Carr v. Fedex Ground Package
System, Inc.,6 2 an employee of J. Wigg Trucking, Inc. (J. Wigg Trucking), an entity with a contract to provide trucking services to FedEx
Ground Package System, Inc. (FedEx), was injured in a fight with a
FedEx employee on FedEx property. The employee's wife sought and
received workers' compensation benefits on the employee's behalf from
J. Wigg Trucking, and subsequently filed a personal injury action
against FedEx, alleging multiple tort claims for negligence. Summary
judgment was granted for FedEx on the grounds that FedEx was a
statutory employer immune to tort liability.63
The appellant argued that the statutory-employer doctrine did not
apply because FedEx was not the employee's statutory employer. The
appellant relied on language in FedEx's contract with J. Wigg Trucking

57. Id. at 440-41, 734 S.E.2d at 210-11.
58. Id. at 442, 734 S.E.2d at 211-12.
59. Id. at 443, 734 S.E.2d at 212 (quoting James, 147 Ga. App. at 309-10, 248 S.E.2d
at 679).
60. Id. at 444, 734 S.E.2d at 213.
61. Id. at 444, 734 S.E.2d at 212-13.
62. 317 Ga. App. 733, 733 S.E.2d 1 (2012).
63. Id. at 733-34, 733 S.E.2d at 2-3.
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providing that J. Wigg Trucking was an independent contractor and
would keep its own workers' compensation coverage.64 The court of
appeals rejected this argument, stating that J. Wigg Trucking's status
as an independent contractor did not preclude a statutory-employment
relationship between FedEx and the employee." Further, the court
determined that parties cannot contract around the obligations of the
Workers' Compensation Act, and specifically, no contract language would
relieve FedEx from its obligation as a statutory employer.
The appellant further argued against the application of the statutoryemployment doctrine on the grounds that FedEx was not a contractor
under the definition of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8(a) because FedEx was not
operating under contracts that existed when it contracted with J. Wigg
Trucking." The court of appeals disagreed and determined that the
package-delivery work the employee performed for J. Wigg Trucking was
pursuant to shipping and delivery contracts FedEx had with FedEx's
customers. 6 9 Because J. Wigg Trucking contracted with FedEx to
perform a portion of the work necessary to be done for FedEx to "fulfill]
subsequently-arising contracts" between FedEx and its customers, FedEx
was a "contractor" for purposes of statutory employment."o Accordingly,
the exclusive remedy provision barred the action for personal injuries. 71
The supreme court addressed the application of the exclusive remedy
provision in Smith v. Ellis72 in its discussion of whether it should
overrule Ridley v. Monroe,7 a court of appeals case that held that the
exclusive remedy provision of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a)74 barred a claim
against a co-employee in a tort action following an O.C.G.A. § 34-9-15(b)7 1 settlement. 76 In Smith, the claimant and a coworker met on
work property to practice shooting guns for personal enjoyment, and the
claimant was accidently shot in the leg. Both employees were fired, and
the claimant filed a workers' compensation claim that was settled on a
no-liability basis. The claimant then sued the coworker for negligence,

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 735, 733 S.E.2d at 3-4.
Id. at 734-35, 733 S.E.2d at 3-4.
Id. at 735-36, 733 S.E.2d at 4.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8(a) (2008).
Carr,317 Ga. App. at 737, 733 S.E.2d at 5.
Id. at 738, 733 S.E.2d at 5.
Id. at 738-39, 733 S.E.2d at 6.
Id.
291 Ga. 566, 731 S.E.2d 731 (2012).
256 Ga. App. 686, 569 S.E.2d 561 (2002).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a) (2008).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-15(b) (2008 & Supp. 2013).
Smith, 291 Ga. App. at 567, 731 S.E.2d at 732.
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and when summary judgment was granted in favor of the coworker on
the basis of the exclusive remedy provision, the employee appealed on
the grounds that the coworker was a third-party tortfeasor and not a coemployee."
The supreme court first examined Ridley, and then held that the
claimant would be barred from suing his coworker in tort for the same
injury for which he had already entered into a Board-approved
settlement with his employer.18 While the exclusive remedy provision
did not apply to an injury that was not compensable under the Workers'
Compensation Act, the fact that the settlement was approved by the
Board, albeit on a no-liability basis, represented an award of the
Board." The court reasoned that a no-liability settlement required an
employer to compensate the employee for the alleged injury, triggering
the protection against a subsequent tort suit even though the injury may
not actually have been deemed compensable under the Workers'
Compensation Act."o The supreme court held that Ridley was correctly
decided, and that the same right-and-remedy logic that prohibits an
employee from seeking an additional remedy against his employer under
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-15(a)s' prohibits an employee from seeking such a
remedy under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-15(b). 8 ' Thus, when a settlement has
been approved by the Board, it constitutes a complete and final
disposition of all claims against the employer and its employees on
account of the injury, regardless of whether the settlement was on a noliability basis.'

In Vratsinas Construction Co. v. Chitwood," the court of appeals
applied the exclusive remedy doctrine to a personal injury claim brought
by an employee of a subcontractor against the subcontractor's general
contractor, and held that the tort claim was barred.' The plaintiff was
an employee of a subcontractor hired by the general contractor. After
sustaining an electric shock and subsequent injuries to multiple body
parts, the employee did not file a workers' compensation claim, but
instead filed a lawsuit in the State Court of Fulton County against the

77. Id. at 567-68, 731 S.E.2d at 732-33.
78. Id. at 567, 731 S.E.2d at 732.
79. Id. at 569, 731 S.E.2d at 733.
80. Id. at 571, 731 S.E.2d at 735.
81. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-15(a) (2008 & Supp. 2013).
82. Smith, 291 Ga. App. at 573-74, 731 S.E.2d at 736-37; Ridley, 256 Ga. App. at 689,
569 S.E.2d at 564.
83. Smith, 291 Ga. App. at 566, 731 S.E.2d at 731; Ridley, 256 Ga. App. at 686, 569
S.E.2d at 561.
84. 314 Ga. App. 357, 723 S.E.2d 740 (2012).
85. Id. at 357, 723 S.E.2d at 741.
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general contractor, alleging negligent failure to maintain a safe work
site. The general contractor moved for summary judgment, arguing that
the plaintiffs exclusive remedy was workers' compensation benefits, and
appealed the trial court's denial of its motion.86
The court of appeals cited O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8(a) for the proposition that
a general contractor becomes the statutory employer of the employees of
any subcontractors hired by the general contractor.8 The court further
observed that O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a) provides that the rights granted to
employees in the Workers' Compensation Act supercede all other rights
of the employee, including those at common law." Because it was
undisputed that the general contractor was the statutory employer of the
plaintiff, the general contractor was immune to tort claims brought by
the employee."
On the other hand, in PHF II Buckhead LLC v. Dinku,o the court of
appeals recognized that a company that contracts out certain services to
another company is not the statutory employer of the other company's
employees.9 ' In Dinku, the claimant was an employee of the parking
services company hired by the operator of a hotel, PHF Buckhead LLC
(PHF). When Dinku was hurt on the job, he filed suit against PHF for
failure to maintain reasonably safe premises.92 The court held that
unlike a relationship between a general contractor and subcontractor,
where the general contractor owes a duty of performance to the property
owner and employs the subcontractor to that end, a mere property owner
does not owe a duty of performance to a third party and thus, pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8," the property owner cannot be a principal
contractor.94 Because PHF did not owe a duty of performance to a
third party with regard to the work done by Dinku (or Dinku's direct
employer), PHF was not the statutory employer of Dinku, and the
exclusive remedy doctrine did not bar the suit."

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 358, 723 S.E.2d at 741-42.
Id. at 358, 723 S.E.2d at 742 (citing O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8(a)).
Id. at 358-59, 723 S.E.2d at 742 (citing O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a)).
Id.
315 Ga. App. 76, 726 S.E.2d 569 (2012).
Id. at 80, 726 S.E.2d at 572-73.
Id. at 77, 726 S.E.2d at 570.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8 (2008).
Dinku, 315 Ga. App. at 79-80, 726 S.E.2d at 572.
Id. at 80, 726 S.E.2d at 572-73.
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In Archer Western Contractors,Ltd. v. Estate of Pitts,9 6 the supreme
court vacated Estate of Pitts v. City of Atlanta, a 2011 court of appeals
decision." These cases involved a construction worker who was struck
and killed by a vehicle driven by the employee of another subcontractor
on the project. The decedent's estate recovered a judgment against the
subcontractor who employed the vehicle's driver, but the judgment was
not satisfied due to a lack of insurance. The estate then brought suit
against the City of Atlanta and several construction companies on the
project because the companies breached contractual duties in their
subcontracts that required each subcontractor to carry a minimum of
$10 million in automobile-liability insurance."
The defendants argued, among other things, that the exclusive remedy
provision barred the estate from seeking damages. The court of appeals
held that because the injury for which the estate sought damages was
not a physical injury, but rather the loss of access to insurance coverage
due to the alleged breach of contract, the exclusive remedy provision did
not apply and would not bar the claim for breach of contract.o The
supreme court, in a lengthy opinion, concluded that the court of appeals
misapplied, or failed to apply, certain fundamental principles of contract
10
law in considering the cases.o
The supreme court determined that the deceased employee was not an
intended beneficiary of every promise contained in the contracts, and
thus the court of appeals drew its conclusion about the extent to which
the employee was an intended beneficiary too broadly.'0 2 The supreme
court also took issue with the court of appeals ruling on the contractor's
duty to ensure that lower-tier subcontractors carried insurance outside
of the "Owner's Controlled Insurance Program." 0 3 Ultimately, the
court did not reach the exclusive remedy question because it concluded
that questions of fact remained.'" The supreme court vacated the
decisions and remanded the cases with instructions for the court of
appeals to determine, among other issues, any contractual promises of

96. 292 Ga. 219, 735 S.E.2d 772 (2012).
97. 312 Ga. App. 599, 719 S.E.2d 7 (2011), vacated Archer W. Contractors, Ltd. v.
Estate of Pitts, 292 Ga. 219, 735 S.E.2d 772 (2012), remanded to sub norn. Estate of Pitts
v. City of Atlanta, 323 Ga. App. 70, 746 S.E.2d 698 (2013).
98. Archer W. Contractors,Ltd., 292 Ga. at 230, 735 S.E.2d at 781.
99. Id. at 220, 735 S.E.2d at 774-75; see also Estate of Pitts, 312 Ga. App. at 599-600,
719 S.E.2d at 9-10.
100. Estate of Pitts, 312 Ga. App. at 606, 719 S.E.2d at 16-17.
101. Archer W. Contractors,Ltd., 292 Ga. at 226, 735 S.E.2d at 776-77.
102. Id. at 226, 735 S.E.2d at 778.
103. Id. at 229, 735 S.E.2d at 780.
104. Id. at 230, 735 S.E.2d at 781.
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which the employee was a beneficiary and the applicability of the
exclusive remedy provision to claims for breach of any contractual
promises of which the decedent might have been an intended beneficia5
ry.10
VI.

UNEXPLAINED DEATH AND THE REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION

In Wilkinson County Board of Education v. Johnson,106 the court of
appeals remanded a claim to the ALJ for further consideration of
whether an employee's death was the result of the employment
exacerbating a preexisting medical condition."o' The employee, a highschool principal who had significant health issues including hypertension
and obesity, was taken from his school to the hospital by ambulance
after he reported sweating, pain, and elevated blood pressure. He was
found to have suffered an acute aortic dissection and underwent
emergency surgery, but died five days later. The autopsy identified his
cause of death as ischemic bowel complication of the aortic dissection. 10
The ALJ denied his widow's claim, finding that she failed to show that
the employee's aortic dissection was attributable to his job performance.' 09 The ALJ further ruled that the claimant was not entitled
to the presumption that the employee's death arose "out of and in the
course of his employment" because he was not found dead in a location
where he could be reasonably expected to be engaged in the performance
of his job duties.no The Board approved, but the Superior Court of
Wilkinson County reversed, finding error in the ALJ's conclusion that
there was no presumption simply because the employee was not found
dead at his place of employment. The superior court reasoned that
because the incident resulting in the employee's death occurred at a time
and place when he was performing the job, the presumption applied, and
the ALJ should have considered whether the employee's death was an
aggravation of a preexisting condition."'
The court of appeals stated that the presumption that a death arose
out of employment-when an employee is found dead in a place where
he might be reasonably expected to perform his duties-applies only

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.

Id.
317 Ga. App. 565, 732 S.E.2d 765 (2012).
Id. at 565, 732 S.E.2d at 766-67.
Id. at 566-67, 732 S.E.2d at 767-68.
Id. at 567, 732 S.E.2d at 768.
Id. at 568, 732 S.E.2d at 768.
Id. at 568-69, 732 S.E.2d at 768.
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when the death is unexplained." 2 Because modern medicine often
provides at least an immediate cause of death, the court noted that only
the precipitating causative factor (and not the immediate causative
factor) must be unexplained in order for the presumption to apply.113
Otherwise, probative evidence on the issue of causation must be
submitted."" The court also clarified that this rule regarding the
presumption also applies when the immediate cause of death arises from
internal and physical factors, as opposed to external and non-physical
factors. 11
Accordingly, the court held that the ALJ and the Board misinterpreted
the law by concluding that the unexplained-death presumption did not
apply because the employee died at the hospital and not a place where
he reasonably could be expected to perform his job, because the law has
been expanded to include employees who become ill at the place of
employment and subsequently die at a hospital." 6 The court also
determined that the superior court made an improper finding of fact
when it substituted its finding that the employee's job performance
caused his death, when neither the ALJ nor the Board had made that
finding, and further misinterpreted the law by applying the presumption
when there was no underlying finding concerning whether the precipitating cause of the employee's death was unexplained."' Accordingly, the
court of appeals remanded the case to the ALJ to determine if the
unexplained-death presumption applied by determining whether: (1) the
incident causing the employee's death occurred in a time and place he
reasonably might be expected to perform his job; and (2) the precipitating cause of his death was unexplained.""
VII.

ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT AND
DEVIATION FOR PERSONAL PURSUIT

In Dixie Roadbuilders, Inc. v. Sallet,"9 the court of appeals addressed a variety of workers' compensation issues, ultimately within the
exclusive remedy context.120 In Sallet, the employee left work without
permission and went to a nearby convenience store where he was shot
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114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 569, 732 S.E.2d at 769.
Id.
Id. at 570-71, 732 S.E.2d at 769.
Id. at 569, 732 S.E.2d at 769.
Id. at 570, 732 S.E.2d at 769-70.
Id. at 570, 732 S.E.2d at 770.
Id. at 570-71, 732 S.E.2d at 770.
318 Ga. App. 228, 733 S.E.2d 511 (2012).
Id.
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during the course of a robbery and eventually died from his wounds.
The evidence showed that the employer either owned or leased the
Without notice to the employee's children (all
convenience store.'
adults), the employer filed a claim with its workers' compensation
insurer, who thereafter voluntarily paid the funeral expenses and,
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-265(f), 122 made payment to the Board.'2 3
The employee's children filed a wrongful death suit against the
employer, claiming that it failed to use reasonable care for the safety of
its customers in the maintenance of the convenience store premises.2"
The employer moved for summary judgment based on the exclusive
remedy doctrine, arguing that the employee's death arose out of and in
the course of his employment, which the State Court of Ware County
denied and the court of appeals considered on interlocutory review."s
The court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning
whether the employee had left work for the day when he went to the
store, as contended by the plaintiffs, or whether he intended to return
to work, as argued by the employer.'26 Even had he intended to return
to work, his trip to the store may have been on a deviation from work
constituting a personal errand. The court held that case-law precedent
did not mandate a holding that, because the employee's break was
unscheduled, he could not have been on a personal pursuit, when the
injury occurred off work premises. 127 The court also declined to hold
as a matter of law that the employee was subject to the employer's
control when he went to the store. 2 1
Lastly, the court rejected the employer's argument that the plaintiffs
were estopped from arguing the inapplicability of the Workers' Compensation Act after accepting workers' compensation benefits in the form of
payment for the funeral services because the payments were made
without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs.129 The court held
that even if the plaintiffs could be said to have accepted the benefits

121. Id. at 229, 733 S.E.2d at 513 ("The Dixie Express store is associated with Dixie
Roadbuilders, [Inc.] but the relationship between the two entities is unclear from the
evidence.").
122. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-265(f) (2008) (requiring employers or insurers to pay one-half of
all benefits due or $10,000, whichever is less, to the Board in the case of a compensable
death claim where there are no eligible dependents).
123. Sallet, 318 Ga. App. at 230, 733 S.E.2d at 513.
124. Id. at 228, 733 S.E.2d at 512.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 231-32, 733 S.E.2d at 514.
127. Id. at 234, 733 S.E.2d at 516.
128. Id. at 233, 733 S.E.2d at 515.
129. Id. at 235, 733 S.E.2d at 516.
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(which they did not know came from the insurer), the acceptance would
not be inconsistent with the assertion of a tort claim.130

In Stokes v. Coweta County Board of Education,a' the court of

appeals also addressed a deviation-from-employment issue.132 The
claimant, a school custodian, was responsible for unlocking the school's
parking-lot gate. On the day of her injury, upon unlocking the gate, she
turned to see her vehicle rolling away from her, and ran after her car in
an attempt to stop it. In so doing, she severely injured her foot, which
was subsequently amputated. While the ALJ awarded benefits, the
Board concluded that the claimant had deviated from her employment
on a personal mission to save her own personal property. The Superior
Court of Coweta County affirmed.'
The court of appeals, however,
determined that the Board misapplied the law in determining that there
was a deviation from the course of employment when the claimant
chased after her car." The court emphasized that the claimant was
performing her employment duties when the car began to roll, and that
but for her fulfillment of her job requirements, the accident would not
have happened."' Her actions, therefore, did not constitute a deviation from her employment."
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Id. at 236, 733 S.E.2d at 517.
313 Ga. App. 505, 722 S.E.2d 118 (2012).
Id. at 510, 722 S.E.2d at 122.
Id. at 507, 510, 722 S.E.2d at 120-22.
Id. at 510, 722 S.E.2d at 122.
Id. at 510, 722 S.E.2d at 122-23.
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